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Progress in human security in the Philippines is infl uenced by the ‘ASEAN Way’, which underscores 
consensual approach to decision-making, informal structures and processes, and the principle of 
non-interference in member-countries’ internal aff airs. Along these lines, ASEAN broadened the 
agenda of security to encompass problems like poverty, epidemics, food security, human rights, and 
climate change, but failed to deepen security from a focus on the state to a focus on human individu-
als and communities. Yet the ‘ASEAN Way’ off ers enough tolerance for ‘operationalising’ possibili-
ties for normative non-state securitisation. Philippine NGOs have intervened in the decision-making 
process, shaped and disseminated politically relevant values and norms, and have taken the initiative 
to set rules themselves. For the Philippine government labouring under ‘soft state’ conditions, the 
most appropriate role based on a human security agenda would be to strengthen existing institu-
tional structures, expand the democratic space for non-state actors, and join inter-state regimes 
and quasi-diplomatic arrangements, thereby reducing transaction costs and facilitating reciprocity 
within ASEAN. 
Keywords: Human Security, Non-State Actors, ASEAN, Securitisation, Diplomatic Tracks
Der „ASEAN Way“, der konsensuelle Entscheidungsprozesse, informelle Strukturen und Prozesse so-
wie das Prinzip der Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten der Mitgliedstaaten betont, 
hat direkte Auswirkungen auf die Weiterentwicklung menschlicher Sicherheit auf den Philippinen. 
Innerhalb dieses Rahmens erweiterte ASEAN die sicherheitspolitische Agenda um Probleme wie Ar-
mut, Epidemien, Nahrungsmittelsicherheit, Menschenrechte und Klimawandel. Es erfolgte jedoch 
keine Vertiefung des Sicherheitsbegriff s durch einen Fokuswechsel vom Staat hin zu Individuen und 
Gruppen – und das obwohl der „ASEAN Way“ ausreichend Operationalisierungsspielraum für nor-
mative nicht-staatliche Sekuritisierung böte. Philippinische NGOs beteiligen sich an politischen Ent-
scheidungsprozessen, beeinfl ussen und vermitteln eigene politisch relevante Werte und Normen, und 
stellen sogar eigene Regeln auf. Für die im Kontext eines „weichen“ staatlichen Rahmens agierende 
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philippinische Regierung wären daher die am meisten angemessenen Aufgaben bei der Verwirkli-
chung der Agenda menschlicher Sicherheit die Stärkung der vorhandenen internationalen Struktu-
ren, die Erweiterung des demokratischen Spielraums für nicht-staatliche Akteure sowie der Beitritt 
zu zwischenstaatlichen Regime und quasi-diplomatischen Arrangements. Damit könnten Transakti-
onskosten gesenkt und die Reziprozität innerhalb ASEANs gefördert werden. 
Schlagworte: Menschliche Sicherheit, Nichtstaatliche Akteure, ASEAN, Sekuritisierung, Diplomati-
sche Ebenen
Introduction 
The central purpose of this paper is to show how non-state actors (NSA) in the 
Philippines translate the concept of human security from discourse to action, and 
consequently, how the state can correspondingly calibrate its own human security 
outlook. Human security is approached using the ‘ASEAN Way’ as context because 
the Philippines is bound and influenced by the policy-making and diplomatic style 
favoured by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This paper argues that 
as a state with a relatively open democratic space but with weak political institutions, 
the Philippines – when seen through the lens of the broader ASEAN practice of human 
security – implies constrained human security outcomes but shows well-articulated 
policies by non-state actors. Along the lines of Arts (2003), the role of non-state 
organisations and players as ‘securitisers’ is analysed in the context of their newly-
found decisional, discursive, regulatory powers in order to demonstrate the shift in 
focus of human security from a state-centric to a people-centred perspective.
The South-East Asian Policy Environment 
ASEAN’s Consensual Approach
The ‘ASEAN Way’ underscores a consensual approach to decision-making, informal 
structures and processes, and the principle of non-interference in member-
countries’ internal affairs (that is, respect for absolute sovereignty) (Camilleri, 
2000; von Feigenblatt, 2009). This line of approach emphasises quiet diplomacy as 
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opposed to institutionalised rules3 and direct censure of individual member states. 
As such, discussions within official ASEAN forums are often low-key, muted by the 
“comfort level” of the individual regimes (Campbell, 2006). Issues arising from any 
serious breach of the objectives and principles adopted in the ASEAN Charter such 
as “respect for and protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”, “rejection of acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, torture, the use of rape 
as an instrument of war, and the discrimination based on gender, race, religion or 
ethnicity”, and “enhancing the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by 
providing them with equitable access to opportunities for human development, social 
welfare and justice” are to be handled nationally (Severino, 2008, pp. 106-109). ASEAN’s 
loose structure and non-binding nature has proven to be an appealing formula for 
a region wary of super-power interference with a vivid memory of colonialism (von 
Feigenblatt, 2009).4
Nonetheless, ASEAN’s diplomatic style may still mean progress in human security 
at many levels precisely because it is less threatening than might otherwise be the 
case (Camilleri, 2000). Voluntary co-operation and mutual non-interference suggests 
a longer-term horizon in arriving at comprehensive security. It may hinder short- and 
mid-term decisive answers, but it also avoids precipitate and impulsive action. And 
the fact that ASEAN has been willing to somewhat relax its cherished non-interference 
principle in specific cases (such as the recent Cambodia-Thailand border rift) may be 
an indication of a shifting attitude in order to make headway on the issue of human 
security in the region. The key, according to Acharya (2007), in making the idea of 
human security the basis for regional co-operation is to ‘localise’ the idea within the 
current security concepts and approaches of ASEAN.
3  The ‘ASEAN Way’, compared to US and European Union human security perspectives, seems to be least 
unambiguous. According to Jensen (2006), the US policy is premised on the “non-negotiable demand of human 
dignity” and the centrality of democratisation and liberalisation of markets in the fulfilment of human security 
goals. US policy can threaten to meet democratic deficits with direct sanction and the latent threat of regime 
change. The EU policy mirrors a narrower interpretation of human security, emphasising multilateral forums and 
comprehensive agreements with a wide range of regional powers. Compared to US ‘instantaneity,’ EU policy allows 
more autonomy, time and resources to its regional partners. Thus the EU avoids imposing a solution and indicates 
a more relativist approach. To the extent that it succeeds in imposing its solution, the US is imposing a particular 
normative interpretation of the region according to a specific universalist code. The ‘ASEAN Way’ is closer to the EU 
perspective, but agreements are non-binding.
4  A more interventionist ‘flexible engagement’ policy, proposed by Thailand towards Burma’s human rights crisis, 
gained support only from the Philippines. A compromise solution within ASEAN was to adopt ‘enhanced interaction’ 
whereby individual member states could disapprove of other members’ domestic affairs but ASEAN as a whole should 
not (Campbell, 2006).
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Broadening the Agenda of Security
Along these lines, ASEAN was one of the first regional alliances to think of 
comprehensive security, an important step toward fulfilling the first important trait 
of human security – the broadening of the agenda of security from the focus on direct 
violence to problems like poverty, epidemics, food security, human rights, and the 
looming effects of climate change. Scheftel (2009) calls this the horizontal integration 
of human security.
In Asia, the recent rise of many non-military issues, such as the Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC), Indonesian forest fires, the Bali terrorist bombings, floods in China, and 
the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), has highlighted the 
shortfalls of the entrenched paradigm of traditional security in the region (Othman, 
2004). ASEAN has moved toward the idea of security as symbolising safety from 
‘threats without enemies’: disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, 
political repression, environmental hazards, piracy, drug trafficking, undocumented 
immigration, separatism, and other border-crossing pathologies. Such diverse 
phenomena, all falling under the rubric of human security, cannot necessarily be 
dealt with successfully by individual member-states. 
ASEAN has succeeded in significantly extending the security debate, without 
automatically deserting the conventional approach of state sovereignty and state-
centricity. Human security hazards have a power to harm communities and 
constituencies which outstrips the state’s power to protect. These hazards have 
exposed the vulnerability of ASEAN member states and clearly restricted their 
defensive capabilities. Because of this ASEAN has recently become more receptive 
to a post-Cold War reassessment of what Lam (2006) calls ‘regime security’ and the 
utility of military power in inter-state conflict. The need to protect people from 
major disruptions in their daily lives has become a legitimate alliance concern.
A more balanced view of human tragedies seems to be emerging, as opposed 
to the tendency to regard security only in the context of military challenges and 
terrorism. After all, more people died from the AIDS epidemic (which can be 
prevented, cured, or effectively managed) than from 9/11 (Sen, undated). Likewise, 
the tsunami in December 2004 claimed more than 126,000 lives in Indonesia alone. 
The Bali bombings in October 2002 killed 200 innocent people. The sense of fear and 
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uncertainty sparked by the SARS epidemic in 2003 was of a far greater magnitude 
than any other transnational challenge, including terrorism (Acharya, 2005). The 
imperative to confront and defeat terrorism remains, as Sen (undated) argues, but 
the enormous toll of human neglect is also being recognised.
Yet another trigger for the shifting attitude, according to Sen (2000), is the region’s 
economic vulnerability. While its economic progress had been very swift for many 
decades, and while poverty levels in the region have decreased considerably, the 
danger of a downturn affecting the lives of hundreds of millions also remains ever 
present – even if the area weathered the Asian economic crisis of 1997 (which wreaked 
havoc on the daily lives of people who had previously felt secure and protected). 
At the bargaining table, ASEAN has matched intentions with accords. Principally 
through the Bali Concord II, ASEAN seeks to establish the ASEAN Security Community, 
along with the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, 
by 2020 (later accelerated to 2015). While economic co-operation is the main driving 
force, ASEAN leaders have recognised that economic integration, the main engine 
of alliance building, will be incomplete without the ‘security’ features (political 
development, human rights, rule of law, and democracy). Along more specific lines, 
the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (1999) has identified the 
threats to human security like illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, arms 
smuggling, terrorism, and various forms of economic crime. The blueprint is being 
implemented at the ministerial level. 
In the wake of the devastation caused by the tsunami in December 2004, ASEAN 
concluded an Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response in 
July 2005. In the field of public health, the Regional Framework for Control and 
Eradication of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza has been put in place. ASEAN has 
likewise launched the ASEAN Plus Three Emerging Infectious Diseases Programme 
(along with China, Japan, and South Korea) in a run-up to the work of the ASEAN 
Disease Surveillance Network. To mitigate the effects of haze pollution resulting 
from forest fires (which disrupt social and economic life, and also adversely affect 
the health and well-being of millions of people in the region), the regional alliance 
came up with the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution of 2002 (Yong 
and Sané, 2007). The ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights of Migrant Workers was issued in 2007. Early on, ASEAN signed the Declaration 
Eduardo T. Gonzalez & Magdalena L. Mendoza - Mainstreaming Human Security in the Philippines 
ASEAS 3(2)
216 217
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region in 1994. Lately, 
ASEAN has established the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AIHCR).
But as Severino (2008) cautions, such commitments are far from binding, and there 
is no evidence that progress in carrying out set interventions is being monitored or 
followed through. The process, tempo, and execution of these accords are still in 
doubt. Nevertheless, the agreements can be invoked in case of egregious violations, 
which suggests a slow, step-by-step progress in advancing human security. They 
likewise open the door for non-state actors to initiate human security activities in 
limited contexts. Where ASEAN is firmly united is in its opposition to the use of 
labour rights in international trade agreements for disguised protectionist purposes. 
ASEAN insists that the subject of labour rights be dealt with in the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) rather than in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Against Deepening of Security
The ‘ASEAN Way’ identifies the referent, or enforcer, of security as the sovereign 
nation-state – a residue of the Cold War’s centripetal tendency of political regimes 
towards the consolidation of state power. Current thinking transcends security for 
states and their sovereignty and focuses on the security of human individuals and 
communities. Scheftel (2009) labels this process the deepening of security through 
the vertical integration of human security. Such deepening is part of the radical 
conceptual shift from national security, with its narrow focus on military defence, to 
human security, with its emphasis on individual welfare (Thakur, 2000). It is people 
who must be protected against dangers that threaten life and well-being – regardless 
of whether these threats can be traced back to societal activities or natural events, 
whether they exist inside or outside the framework of the state, whether they are 
direct or structural (Burgess & Owen, 2004).
Generally, what confronts the survival of the state also threatens the survival of 
its people. Yet the converse is not always true: menaces which affect people might 
not necessarily threaten the continued existence of states. Human security may thus 
be quite distinct from the security of the state. As Acharya (2005) illustrates, events 
like the AFC and SARS threatened neither the physical boundaries nor the territorial 
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integrity of states in the region, which is the core of the national security paradigm. 
Even if the AFC triggered a chain of events that led to the collapse of one of Asia’s 
most entrenched authoritarian regimes – Indonesia’s Suharto –and the separation of 
East Timor as an independent nation state, what was really at stake was the safety of 
the Indonesian people, their livelihoods, their health, and their sense of well-being. 
Acharya also observed that the massacre of the Indonesian Chinese that followed the 
fall of Suharto again did not endanger the state itself. 
As Dahl-Eriksen (2007) contends, there are situations for which governments cannot 
be held responsible. On the other hand, state power itself, exercised repressively, 
could be a threat towards individuals (Dahl-Eriksen, 2007), as when a state’s policies 
and laws discriminate against certain minority groups (Othman, 2004). Or, the threat 
could take the form of the incapacity of the state – whether through incompetence 
or lack of needed resources and infrastructure – to make available safety, health, 
justice, basic human rights, and education to develop the skills that lead to economic 
and social well-being (Othman, 2004). 
An adequate concept of human security, Sen (undated) points out, includes 
at least the following distinct elements: (1) a distinct focus on human lives; (2) an 
appreciation of the role of society and of social arrangements in making human lives 
more secure in a constructive way (avoiding a socially detached view of individual 
human predicaments); and (3) a fuller understanding of the coverage of human rights, 
which have to include not just political freedom and personal liberties (important as 
they are), but also societal concern with food, medical attention, basic education, 
and other elementary needs of human lives.
ASEAN’s historical preoccupation with regime security and the institutionalised 
retention of the political elite (Campbell, 2006) does not augur well for a normative 
shift toward a people-centric security perspective. If ASEAN has acted on matters 
that directly affect people’s lives (such as SARS, the tsunami, or haze pollution), it has 
done so because it was forced to by circumstances (Severino, 2008). ASEAN has been 
challenged to reassess its priorities and its ability to manage human disasters in the 
wake of regional and domestic menaces that impair human lives.
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Protective Versus Developmental Security
A closer look suggests that ASEAN may be averse only to protective human security, 
which stresses ‘freedom from fear’ and individual rights against political repression. 
The international ‘responsibility to protect’ and its implicit challenge to sovereignty, 
arguably falls within the parameters of ‘protective human security.’ ASEAN elites may 
be more comfortable with developmental human security, which stresses ‘freedom 
from want’ and the importance of economic issues in advancing human security, 
and avoids (for the time being) dealing with civil and political rights (von Feigenblatt, 
2009). 
‘Freedom from fear’ is understood as freedom from pervasive threats to people’s 
rights, safety or lives only (Floyd, 2007; Caballero-Anthony, 2004) and emphasises 
civil-political human rights in particular (Richardson, 2007). It is the foundation of 
protective human security. The Canadian government favours this approach, which 
emphasises the protection of the dignity of the individual and the prevention of cruelty 
to people caught in zones of conflict (Acharya, 2005). It stresses the international 
community’s ‘responsibility to protect’, which suggests that it does not rule out the 
collective use of force and/or sanctions and regime change if and when necessary 
(Caballero-Anthony, 2004) in order to protect individuals in other countries from 
genocide, ethnic cleansing or other physical threats beyond the capability of their 
home governments, with or without the government’s approval.5 It thus favours 
short- and mid-term decisive action. Protective human security has an unpalatable 
implication for ASEAN: it aims to break the barrier of absolute sovereignty in order to 
enforce the protection of human rights (von Feigenblatt, 2009).
‘Freedom from want’ is understood as safety from threats such as poverty, disease, 
and environmental disasters (Floyd, 2007). It draws on economic, social and cultural 
rights, includes development issues, and emphasises the creation and maintenance 
of a stable social and economic environment (Richardson, 2007; Acharya, 2005). 
It is the basis for developmental human security. It has been mainly promoted by 
5  According to Acharya (2005), in the post-9/11 political environment, freedom from fear has acquired a new 
meaning: fear of freedoms. The framing of terrorism as a national security concern has undermined the key bases 
of human security, such as multilateral peacekeeping in the region as well as confidence and trust-building. This 
is reflected in the narrowing of military-political perspective and approach between Western and some ASEAN 
governments (expressed in legislation that allows ever more intrusive surveillance). The region’s elites could perhaps 
even take pride that their own security laws (say, Malaysia’s Internal Security Act, or the Philippines’ Human Security 
Act) closely resemble the US’ Patriot Act, which essentially adopts a freedom from fear perspective.
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the Japanese government through supporting a number of developmental projects 
overseas (Caballero-Anthony, 2004). It favours a long-term vision of development and 
goals for transformation. It does not deny the monopoly on the use of coercive power 
by the nation-state and thus serves as a cover for the strengthening of governing 
elites. Clearly it is the most compatible and favoured version of human security by 
regional elites and matches perfectly with the ‘ASEAN Way’ (von Feigenblatt, 2009).
Specifying the ‘Vital Core’
In 2001, the Commission on Human Security, established through a Japanese initiative, 
argued for protecting the ‘vital core’ of human lives in ways that enhance human 
freedom and human fulfilment (Dahl-Eriksen, 2007).
This vital core is specified in terms of capabilities and resources needed to escape 
from absolute poverty. Its articulation is the capability approach which re-orients 
the objective of economic activity from an instrumental end (economic growth) 
to a people-centred end (expanding people’s freedom). In plain terms, capabilities 
consist of the capability to enjoy a set of valuable ‘beings and doings’, such as being 
nourished, being confident, being able to walk about without terror, being able to 
wear what you like, and having a say in group decisions. The approach also focuses 
on the opportunity to attain positive economic, social, or cultural freedoms, and 
likewise includes both civil and political liberties. It also may include agency, which is 
the freedom to bring about achievements according to one’s values. It is consistent 
with the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) human development 
approach, which describes the capability approach as “expanding people’s choices” 
(Alkire, 2003). 
The repercussions of specifying capabilities, as what Alkire (2003) calls a coherent 
space in which to identify the elements and threshold of the ‘vital core’, are central 
to ASEAN’s need to ‘resolve’ its own predilections. First, as noted by Alkire, the 
capability approach solidifies human security’s central focus on human beings. More 
importantly, as economist Amartya Sen suggests, the capability approach links human 
beings to economic opportunities, social facilities, the enabling conditions of good 
health, basic education, the encouragement and cultivation of entrepreneurship, and 
political liberties (Sen, undated). To the extent that the capability approach mirrors 
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the developmental human security perspective, in a context where economic, social, 
and cultural rights are prominent, ASEAN governments would have no trouble 
accepting it. ASEAN will continue being challenged on its insistence to regard political 
rights as a relativist (more akin to ‘Asian values’) rather than a universalist (global) 
prescription, but it will adopt developmental security for as long as an emphasis sits 
on building socio-economic capabilities and on a sequence of implementation from 
capabilities to rights.
Despite shortcomings in its interpretation of human security, the ‘ASEAN Way’ 
possesses certain positive attributes. These include: the increasing possibility for 
contextualised policies by both state and non-state actors due to an aversion to 
solutions imposed from without, a consensual approach that may help build a 
‘sheltering’ social capital among peoples and communities within and across nations, 
and a vital core that provides the platform to allow individuals and communities 
to pursue human security projects. These factors ‘operationalise’ possibilities for 
normative non-state securitisation. They enable individuals and groups to (at least 
to some small degree) initiate securitisations (deal with existential threats), on behalf 
of those who are otherwise not in a position to speak for themselves or exercise decision-
making power in terms of security policy-making (including disadvantaged groups and 
academics). Securitising actors can influence select securitisation processes in a 
deliberate and thought-out fashion, to a desired effect. Examples of such ‘enabling’ 
securitisations on the world stage are the high profile ban on land mines and the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court (Floyd, 2007), where a network of 
diverse actors effectively worked together, even if they had disparate perspectives 
on human security (Amouyel, 2006). More modestly, in the ASEAN region, non-state 
actors have successfully pushed for labour rights as a non-trade-negotiable issue. The 
literature indeed credits non-governmental sectors with ‘reframing’ and advancing a 
more human-centric agenda within ASEAN. A shift from purely state-focused security 
policies to more people-focused ones will increase the effectiveness of such policies 
by creating ones that better meet people’s needs and empowering people through 
their participation in development (Stanley Foundation, 2003).
This paper adopts the ‘vital core’ perspective and argues for mainstreaming human 
security in the Philippines. It acknowledges arguments that the “multidimensional 
approach to security sacrifices precision for inclusiveness” (Thakur, 2000) and that 
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making individuals the ultimate referent object can be costly in terms of the loss of 
analytical purchase on collective actors both as the main agents of security provision 
and as possessors of a claim to survival in their own right (Buzan, 2004). Nonetheless 
it contends that the human security approach, though inadequate with regard to 
analytical utility, has much to offer in terms of normative utility, which is in part 
operationalised through individual and community securitisations (Amouyel, 2006).
ASEAN Contextualisation in the Philippines 
How the ASEAN States Fare in Human Security
How would some of the ASEAN states fare regarding human security concerns, given 
their adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way’? The possible combinations of these conditions 
and outcomes are summarised in the matrix below (the concepts, in modified form, 
are borrowed from Jensen, 2006). Even if the region is defined by the ‘ASEAN Way’, 
when it comes to defining specific policy approaches, there is a need to revert to 
treating states separately. The state’s authenticity can refer to the legitimacy a state 
draws from its willingness to protect its population under ASEAN rules of non-
Framework adopted from Jensen (2006, p. 44); Country classifications by 
authors; no sufficient data exist to classify Brunei and Timor-Leste.
Table 1: Matrix of Human Security Outcomes in South-East Asia
Strong Normative Initiative
Best human security results; 
most contextualised policies
Thailand
Human security contextua-
lised but on terms enforced by 
the regime
Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam
Refusal to compromise;  
human security considered 
interventionist tool
State With Relatively 
Open Securitisation 
Practices
State With 
Autocratic 
Practices
State With 
Doubtful 
Mandate
Weak Normative Initiative
Limited human security results;  
possibility for contextualised  
policies by non-state actors
Philippines, Indonesia
Imposed results if any; least  
contextualised outcomes
Cambodia, Laos
Poor prospects for human security; 
dangerous outcomes possible
Myanmar
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interference and gradualism. Resistance, on the other hand, draws from the tendency 
to regard the policy instruments on human security as a Trojan horse for Western 
intervention in the internal affairs of states. As Acharya (2007) points out, any link 
between human security and the ‘ASEAN Way’ is contingent on the nature of each 
member-state’s government.
When the broader ASEAN practice of human security is filtered by contextualisation 
of domestic actors and their initiatives within member-states, it would seem that if 
the political will is strong, nations with relatively open securitisation practices (e.g. 
Thailand) would yield the best human security results and most contextualised policies, 
while states with autocratic practices would see human security contextualised but 
on terms enforced by the regime (e.g., Singapore, Malaysia). 
Ensuring regime consolidation, where democratic legitimacy is inadequate and 
violent repression is logistically infeasible, also requires some measure of domestic 
consent to authoritarian rule. At the same time, where issues of national security, 
development and cultural continuity are stressed, and simultaneously, “regime” and 
“state” are conflated, ASEAN autocrats resort to claims that “strong leadership” is 
needed to protect the common good (Campbell, 2006).
If political will is weak, states with relatively open practices would show constrained 
human security results but well-articulated, contextualised policies by securitising 
non-state actors (e.g., the Philippines). Following Jensen’s (2006) argument, when the 
state is subject to the kind of “autonomy capture” which removes human security 
from its list of priorities (Myanmar is the example), it remains a riddle as to how the 
grey area of the state’s legitimacy should be considered when the ASEAN threshold 
of non-interference has not yet been crossed but the state is also not fulfilling its 
obligations towards its population. Here, regime maintenance is regarded as more 
important than the condition of the citizens of the regime.
The overall picture is best summarised by Campbell (2006) and Acharya (2007): 
Democratic transitions (if not consolidation) in several regional polities, including 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, have created greater democratic space for 
human security concepts and approaches. Such openness has been the outcome of 
the state-sponsored economic growth of these ASEAN countries. With the rise of a 
more self-confident population (particularly the middle-class), political elites within 
some ASEAN states have had to attend to popular demands for reform associated 
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with human security issues. These pressures have also served to encourage the 
independence of civil society that creates greater awareness of the need for people’s 
initiatives and the dangers of excessive concentration on national security. Some 
of the governments of these states have also championed the human security 
concept more openly as a way of distancing themselves from their authoritarian 
predecessors, enhancing their legitimacy and attracting development assistance. 
While democratisation within ASEAN member states remains locked up in the 
tensions between domestic citizens and established political elites, the above trends 
suggest the possibility of further openness in South-East Asia and, in turn, improved 
regional promotion of human security. The emancipatory project of creating open 
structures is alive within some states in South-East Asia. 
The strongest inference is that the political will to achieve human security goals 
is probably necessary on both sides (state and non-state) to achieve substantive 
results (Jensen, 2006). But with varying political will and normative initiative by 
the state, non-state actors become crucial. In the Philippines, that leaves open the 
field of action to non-state participants, who in some ways ‘substitute’ for the weak 
authority of the state.
The Power of Non-state Actors 6
Despite their asymmetrical relationship with the state, non-state actors have turned 
the tide in human security – through social networking, informal diplomacy, and 
by putting pressure on nation-states. As Wehrenfennig (2008) argues, while the 
state itself, using traditional diplomacy, is struggling to respond to new global and 
domestic initiatives, NSAs are making better use of various forms (tracks) of non-state 
diplomacy and their own skills and resources to form alliances, internally as well as 
across state borders in order to extract reasonable outcomes. NSAs are challenging 
ASEAN’s regime-centred policies and rhetoric more directly and substantially than 
extra-regional appeals for human security.
6  For purposes of this paper, non-state actors are defined as those operating within a state. These include 
international NGOs with substantial presence in the state, civil society organisations, people’s organisations (PO), 
and epistemic communities which have substantial constituencies and which have access (no matter how limited) to 
political arenas. Inter-governmental organisations are excluded.
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The instrumental role played by NGOs, or Track III7 in ASEAN parlance, importantly 
explains the change in ASEAN’s attitudes towards human-centric norms. Again, 
the threats and crises helped these transnational activists and their domestic 
counterparts to ‘reframe’ the human security agenda. This job could not have 
possibly been undertaken by Track I and Track II working in an ASEAN multilateral 
diplomacy framework, given their historical preoccupation with state-centric norms. 
The key for Track III was to engage Track II in numerous conferences in order to 
convince the latter to adopt unconventional security issues in the workshop. Track 
II participants do not have to bear the responsibility of representing their respective 
countries, hence it is easier for them to embrace new norms. But if state action is 
required, Track III’s hopes lie in Track II being able to influence Track I when Track II 
officials interact with Track I workers (Cheeppensook, 2007). Some Track III groups 
that Cheeppensook counts as quite active are the People’s Forum, which has been 
organising conferences in order to convey the message that the growth-oriented 
development model is not the only path towards well-being, the Asian Exchange for 
New Alternatives (ARENA), which is a contact point for intellectuals to search for a 
more humane ASEAN order, and the Asian Task Force on NGOs (ATF), which organises 
training workshops and dialogues.
High-profile non-state actors raise the bar for effective multi-level inter-NGO 
networking strategies, and turn a multidimensional topic into a high priority issue 
in national human security discourse. They build coalitions within states among like-
minded groups and convert others to embrace the cause. Following Kötter (2007), co-
operation with local/homegrown NGOs provides the type of proximity that human 
security requires. 
The principle of subsidiarity – that maximal responsibility should not be assigned to 
a higher level (e.g. national or regional) if the most local or specialised organisations 
are capable of undertaking it – ensures that the freedom and self-direction of local 
NGOs are preserved, while large international NGOs siphon off needs which cannot 
be addressed by smaller or weaker groups, or where there are significant economies 
of scale (Alkire, 2003). Such an approach responds to the actual needs of citizens, 
preserving their right to decide on resource allocation and distribution (Tadjbakhsh 
7  The three ASEAN diplomatic channels are: Track I – state (formal intergovernmental processes), Track II – state 
(informal, non-binding intergovernmental discussions, with civil society participation), and Track III – non-state (civil 
society networks).
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& Tomescu-Hatto, 2007). It has the very constructive result of encouraging local 
‘ownership’ of projects vis-à-vis the high-level formal dialogues initiated under ASEAN 
auspices.
To be effective securitisers, non-state organisations, and players must be equipped 
with the following three facets of power, as articulated by Arts (2003): 
1. Decisional power, which is related to policy-making and political influence. In 
order to be consequential, NSAs need to intervene, directly or indirectly, in 
the decision-making process they want to influence. They can do so in several 
ways: lobbying, advocacy, monitoring, protest, and participation.
2. Discursive power, which is related to the framing of discourse. Conceivably, 
NSAs – by shaping and disseminating politically relevant values, norms, theories 
and stories – co-determine the behaviour of states and other participants. 
3. Regulatory power, which is related to rule-making and institution-building. 
Rather than wait for governments and intergovernmental organisations to 
establish public rules, NGAs can set rules themselves. Rule-making in this 
context is to be considered standard-setting, whereby a standard is defined 
as an expertise-based voluntary rule on organisational regulations, structures 
and/or procedures.
In concert, they constitute the power of non-state agents, i.e. the capacity 
“to achieve outcomes” in social interactions, embedded in institutional and local 
contexts.
Mainstreaming Under Weak State Constraints 
Following the non-violent uprisings that unseated the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 
(People Power Revolution I) and the short-lived Estrada administration that was 
tainted by corruption (People Power Revolution II), the Philippines is a re-established, 
if frail, democracy. Its GDP per capita of USD 1,639 means that it sits squarely in the 
middle of ASEAN in terms of national wealth, below Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and only slightly lower than Indonesia, but above Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, 
and Myanmar. As an archipelago, the Philippines has suffered from similar problems 
as Indonesia in terms of violent secessionism or problems compounded by the 
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emergence of Islamist terrorist organisations such as Abu Sayyaf (APCR2P, 2009). It 
likewise continues to face one of the most enduring Communist insurgencies in the 
region. Geographically, the country is within both the typhoon belt and the ‘ring of 
fire’ in the Pacific, making it vulnerable to natural disasters. 
For years the Philippines has struggled to respond to human security fundamentals. 
The Philippine state’s somewhat weaker normative initiative derives from its ‘soft 
state’ characteristics – lacking a disciplined and capable bureaucratic culture, a 
cogent societal fabric, and a strong political will to overcome such weakness (Myrdal, 
1970) – and its (formal, non-substantive) democratic procedures, which often lead to 
gridlock.
Post-Martial Law Structural Power of Philippine NGOs 
The Aquino Administration is credited with the burgeoning of NSAs in the 
Philippines, principally the NGOs. When President Aquino appointed the delegates 
to a convention charged with drafting a new constitution in 1987, over 20 percent 
of them were popularly associated with the NGO/PO community (Clarke, 1998). The 
new constitution, which is currently still in place, provided for NGO participation in 
national life to an extent that was unique in the developing world. Article II, Section 23 
states: “The state shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral 
organisations that promote the welfare of the nation.” Article XIII, Section 15 states: 
“The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organisations to enable the 
people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and 
collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.” Article XIII, 
Section 16 states: “The right of the people and their organisations to effective and 
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making 
shall not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate 
consultation mechanisms.” Article X, Section 14 provides for NGO participation in 
local government structures. A devolution law, the Local Government Code, legislated 
in 1991, is perhaps the most sweeping measure to recognise the governance role of 
civil society groups in the Philippines.
Estimates of the number of civil society groups in the Philippines range up to 
500,000, although only a fraction of this figure are registered as non-stock, non-
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government institutions (NGOs, POs). The number of ‘development-oriented’ NGOs 
is put at somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000. In any case, there is consensus that 
the civil society sector is large and vibrant by developing country standards, even 
though most of the large number of organisations are small, struggle financially, 
and have weak capacity (ADB, 2007). These NSAs act as lobbyists, watchdogs, 
advocates, alternative delivery systems, and discussion forums for a plethora of 
social, economic, political, environment and other issues (Gonzalez, 2001) in location-
specific, complex, and constantly changing contexts. Although these mechanisms 
have been held back every now and then by government meddling, they offer on 
paper the most effective means of promoting human security at the community and 
national levels. By operating beneath state obstruction, they have proved their worth 
through networking and coalition building, campaigning for policy reform, adopting 
good practice standards, and advancing “sustainable development” as a uniting vision 
for all organisations (ADB, 2007). Following Jensen (2006), such local initiatives have 
operationalised universalist human security fundamentals in a relativised context.
Decisional, Discursive, and Regulatory Powers
As ‘securitisers’, non-state organisations and players have exercised, following Arts 
(2003), decisional, discursive, and regulatory powers in order to advance human 
security concerns. A few examples are illustrated below.
Decisional Power. The Philippine environmental NGOs’ successful lobbying, 
advocacy, and monitoring that led to the passage of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
Act (IPRA) is the most-talked about example of NGO decisional influence in the 
country. Various non-state policy actors were involved in the passage of the IPRA, 
basically an ancestral domain law, beginning from the agenda-setting phase to policy 
formulation and policy adoption. The Coalition for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and 
Ancestral Domains (CIPRAD), a network of 15 indigenous peoples’ organisations and 
five NGOs, collaborated with Filipino legislators and the legislative staff members to 
smooth the process of the bill’s approval by the Philippine Congress. After arriving 
at a consensus and bargaining with one another, the civil society groups’ effort bore 
fruit when the bill was passed during the Ramos Administration in 1997 (Luserio 
Rico, 2005), a full decade ahead of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
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Peoples. Tacit Track II support came in the form of the ILO-Inter-Regional Programme 
to Support Self-Reliance of Indigenous and Tribal Communities through Cooperatives 
and Self-Help Organizations (INDISCO) (ADB, 2002). This pioneering effort did not 
catch fire in ASEAN, however, except in Cambodia which had passed a similar law 
(SEACA, 2007). In part the reason is that ASEAN nations signed the UN Declaration 
only after 2007. In part, indigenous rights are ensconced within the term ‘ancestral 
domain’ (which suggests retention of ‘aboriginal title’ to lands claimed by indigenous 
groups, significant management rights, and respect for their traditions and identity) 
which is not a common international reference and needed to be parsed into 
territory, economic resources, and governance (Tuminez, 2005). As Tuminez further 
indicates, there are two hurdles to negotiating ancestral domain: public support 
through consensus, and accommodation of cultural and social differences. There 
are likewise divergences among ASEAN states in framing the issue of control over 
resources. In Aceh, Indonesia, for instance, the right of the Acehnese to secure 
political control over their territory did not take a communitarian form, but the 
form of a secure access to an economic base along the lines of conventional property 
rights. Moreover, whereas the Philippine state’s support came at the end in the case 
of IPRA, the Indonesian government was very much involved in exercising its political 
power at the beginning of the Aceh negotiations, as Sevilla observes (2008). Today, 
Track I initiatives (review of legal frameworks) in ASEAN are being encouraged by 
the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, while Track III 
measures are sporadically underway, such as those being initiated in ASEAN countries 
by the International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests 
(IAITPTF) (SEACA, 2007).
Interestingly, Tracks I, II, and III function as a team in certain cases, as in the 
effort to contain Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. ASEAN governments (Track I) 
readily shared information and best practices in preventing the transmission of SARS 
within the member states, in contact tracing, and in aspects involving epidemiology, 
clinical features, public health measures, and infection control (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2003). Track II engagements in the Philippines included the formation of a local 
network of health agency professionals and health-based NGOs to formulate clinical 
guidelines for Philippine SARS preparedness (Lopez, 2003). For Track III, the Philippine 
SARS Response Network was organised by civil society groups (e.g., Friendly Care 
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Clinics, Medical Action Group), academia (e.g. the University of the Philippines 
College of Medicine and College of Public Health), and other multi-sectoral groups 
(e.g. Philippine Foundation for Sustainable Society) (Datol, 2003). The high level of 
co-operation could only be made possible, according to Caballero-Anthony (2002), 
in cases when (1) epidemics can reach crisis proportions beyond the capabilities of 
states to manage, and (2) grave threats leave little room for ideological contestation 
or policy preferences. The immediacy of the threats, in the context of a human 
security framework, easily generates regional and national consensus. Indeed, a 
huge ideological or cultural divide can thwart collaboration. In the case of support 
for counter-terrorism, the Philippines readily consented to the US ‘war on terror’, 
while Malaysia and Indonesia moved rather cautiously because of the complexity 
and sensitivity of having a large Muslim population (Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004). 
Conversely, in the case of the promotion of reproductive health, most ASEAN states 
and health NGOs have readily adopted WHO standards, while the health stakeholders 
of predominantly Catholic Philippines are locked in a battle with the country’s church 
hierarchy, which is opposed to contraceptive methods (Fabros, 2010). 
Discursive Power. Human rights NGOs in the Philippines reframed the discourse 
on human rights after the Marcos dictatorship was toppled and contributed to 
elaborating the present human rights regime. Notable among the rights-based 
NGOs are the Task Force Detainees (for political prisoners), the Free Legal Assistance 
Group (lawyers assisting human rights victims, Karapatan (alliance of human rights 
associations), National Union of Journalists, and Families of Victims of Involuntary 
Disappearance. Many of their leaders advise the government-run Commission on 
Human Rights. They have held the state accountable for human rights infractions, 
an activity that has reduced the incidence of violations, thereby ameliorating related 
human security issues. The favourable rights environment that developed also made 
possible the adoption by the Philippine judiciary in 2007 of the writ of amparo, a legal 
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been 
violated or is threatened with violation. It was conceived to address the issue of 
extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances after 1999 (Puno, 2007). Deep linkages 
with Track III international human rights organisations (e.g. Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, and lately, the Asian Federation Against Involuntary 
Disappearances) have made possible the marshalling of global action against the 
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perceived human rights abuses of the Arroyo administration. However, as the war 
on terror expands in South-East Asia, the cost to civil liberties may likewise be rising. 
Track III leaders remain concerned that anti-terrorism initiatives can be used to serve 
other political agendas. Human rights organisations, in particular, from Imparsial in 
Indonesia to SUARAM in Malaysia, are apprehensive that counter-terrorism measures 
would restrict hard-won rights (Jones, 2002). In the Philippines, the Human Security 
Act of 2007 has been heavily criticised for inadequately guaranteeing possible human 
rights violations committed by state agents in pursuing groups suspected of terrorist 
activities (FIDH, 2008). These developments necessitate vigilance on the part of Track 
III participants in order to foil Track I excesses.
In another noteworthy display of discursive power, peace-seeking groups have 
created, and have reached out to, local constituencies about specific issues that are 
based on perceived common values. One prominent example of this is the peace 
process that led to the peace pact between the government and the main Muslim 
rebel group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), in 1998. Many non-state 
actors created a multi-level dialogue process and formed a peace network. This 
connected local, regional, national, and global actors (including the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference) into a powerful peace constituency that put pressure on the 
official peace process. A key Track I participant, Indonesia, hosted the peace talks 
that led to the peace agreement. A national consensus was reached through the joint 
effort of government and peace and development NGOs. Between Track I and Track 
III lines, the government has also started an interfaith and intercultural dialogue 
on preventing conflicts and healing social wounds in conflict-stricken communities 
in the southern Philippines. Interfaith dialogue has been found to be essential in 
translating shared values of peace and respect into practical action at the grassroots 
level (APCR2P, 2009). Such exchange of ideas has become more urgent as periods of 
violence seem to have no clear beginnings or endings. The situation in the southern 
Philippines, for instance, was supposed to be ‘post-conflict’ after the Jakarta accords 
between the Philippine government and MNLF in 1998, but has clearly reverted to 
being in the midst of conflict. 
Regulatory Power. Local health and education boards, with substantial NGO 
participation, have set rules on health care and basic education at the local government 
level. Procurement committees in government agencies have NGO members setting 
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regulations on government purchases. Local environmental groups, such as Haribon 
and Kalikasan, have designed and institutionalised environmental management 
systems, covering rules on stewardship, accountability, continuous improvement, 
a community-right-to-know policy, and codes of practice (community awareness 
and emergency response). Microfinance NGOs (such as the Microfinance Council of 
the Philippines), have devised alternative options for non-collateralised loans (like 
group accountability) and savings instruments for the poor, following the Grameen 
principles. These are cases of non-state actors filling the institutional gap occasioned 
by state structures that are weak or lack authority. Such substitutive mechanisms 
thrive precisely in environments where formal rules are not routinely enforced or fail 
to achieve their goals (Helmke & Levtisky, 2004). Track II groups, such as Greenpeace 
South-East Asia and Climate Action Network South-East Asia, are providing logistical 
and technical assistance to local environmental NGOs, co-ordinate information 
exchange, and lobby ASEAN governments on sustainable development issues as well. 
New Roles for the State 
Human security does not bypass the Philippine state, weak though it is. The state 
remains an indispensable aspect of human security, even if it is not the ultimate 
answer for protecting its citizens. A weak state with few resources and with a policy 
apparatus that works in fits and turns may still be better than none at all. Domestic 
organisations cannot operate independently of the state. Inasmuch as security is 
built from below, a “downside-up” perspective (Dahl-Eriksen, 2007) demands the 
ability to deal with two parallel institutions: active non-state actors on the one hand, 
and an ineffective state, on the other. To be sure, in this setup, NGOs and other 
civil society groups have the initial advantage in negotiating normative frameworks, 
extracting concessions from government, and lobbying for a people-centric human 
security program.
The most appropriate role for the Philippine government based on a human 
security agenda would be to facilitate productive change by its own agencies. 
Corruption, inefficiencies, and a generalised system of patronage and clientelism 
have hobbled the Philippine government for decades. Rebuilding existing structures 
to improve their capacity and effectiveness as opposed to imposing a new order of 
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affairs will be a wise step in the direction of instituting good governance practices 
in the bureaucracy. Certainly, an effective human security approach will require the 
following good governance requirements, as summarised in ESCAP (2010): 
•	 Fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially; impartial enforcement of 
laws requires an independent judiciary as well as an impartial and incorruptible 
police force
•	 Information that is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be 
affected by government decisions and their enforcement
•	 Processes that serve the public within a reasonable timeframe
•	 Socially-inclusive policies and regulations
•	 Participatory mechanisms at various levels of governance
•	 Results-oriented monitoring and evaluation instruments
•	 Decision-making that is accountable to the public and to all stakeholders
The government has likewise to develop an institutional framework where 
human security concerns direct developmental resources. On this score, Sen (2000) 
proposes getting government commitment not just for “growth with equity” but for 
“downturn with security”, inasmuch as economic slumps are common in emerging 
economies. But human security policies that yield numerous positive externalities, 
for instance, health and education (Amouyel, 2006), or that only require a minimum 
level of development (community-based health insurance) (Fordelone & Schütte, 
2007), or that are free of ideological baggage (Caballero-Anthony, 2002) may be 
administratively easier to deal with. This would actually be a way to prioritise 
certain elements of human security over others. Analyzing one threat, grievance, or 
problem can resolve several issues at once, so it may not be sensible to categorically 
separate threats, rights, and underdevelopment issues (Amouyel, 2006). If one issue 
is addressed successfully, it should have positive consequences for other human 
security issues. For example, successfully reducing illegal logging resolves a number 
of other key problems: loss of forest cover (affects watersheds), drugs (truck drivers 
resort to stimulants to keep themselves awake on long-haul trips), malaria and 
other communicable diseases (spread during logging and deforestation), industrial 
pollution, organised crime (associated with logging syndicates), and corruption 
(bribes for forest guards and highway police). 
To offset its own weaknesses, the state can, to appropriate the words of Tadjbakhsh 
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and Chenoy (2006), organise public space in such a way that it opens possibilities 
for NGOs, civil society, international and local organisations, individuals, and 
communities to create networks and mobilise social resources. This may jump-start 
a diffusion of human security from the bottom to the top. The Local Government 
Code of 1991 already enables the government to assist NGOs through: 
•	 a process of accreditation of NGOs and POs at the local level;
•	 a local governance infrastructure composed of five special bodies, e.g. the 
local development council must be formed at the local level;
•	 a stipulation that at least one quarter of the local development council’s 
membership must come from civil society or the private sector, which civil 
society representatives must come from locally-accredited organisations;
•	 the right of the people to amend, revoke, and enact ordinances through 
referenda;
•	 provisions for the establishment of other local committees, such as co-
operatives.
What is essential is that these provisions are carried out fully and uniformly across 
local government units.
Inter-State Co-operation 
Human security is amplified through inter-state regimes which reduce transaction 
costs, make commitments more credible, and facilitate reciprocity among nations 
(Kim and Hyun, 2000). For the Philippines, these are the benefits to inter-state co-
ordination. It can lean on three pillars, on which collective security is to be based, 
following Felício (2007): 
1. Collective vulnerability. Since today’s threats recognise no national boundaries, 
the Philippines can share its own threat suppression experience involving both 
state and non-state actors, limited though it may be.
2. National limitations. No state can unilaterally dispel that vulnerability. The 
Philippines will have to rely on its stronger neighbours’ threat containment 
instruments and strategies. The question arises, however, of how a neighbouring 
actor can promote a human security agenda without imposing an exterior and 
foreign solution that does not mesh with the local context.
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3. National fallibility. Each state will not always be able, or willing, to meet its 
responsibility to protect its own people, and to not harm its neighbours. Being 
a weaker state in the alliance, the Philippines may have to invoke mutual 
protection clauses of regional agreements. If it is the one being harmed, it 
will have to seek help from extra-regional authorities to pre-empt the threat. 
Curiously, however, in an important instance, the Philippines has shown 
disinterest when it was not the source or ‘hot spot’ of a particular threat. When 
the regional Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution entered into force in 
November 2003, the Philippines did not ratify it and to date has not done so. 
Haze pollution often originates from Indonesia (another non-ratifier), which 
is obliged under the agreement to contain the haze to its national jurisdiction 
(Severino, 2008). It is true that no forest fire haze had reached the country in 
the past to threaten the health of Filipinos, but non-ratification might haunt 
the Philippines later, when it is its turn to request reciprocal treatment from 
its neighbours. 
Treaty-based agreements depend on joint implementation by ASEAN member 
states. Yet because most regional pacts are essentially non-binding, they may 
occasion difficulties for the Philippines. The Philippines may have to initiate what 
Acharya (2007) proposes as a collective rethinking of non-interference, in favour of 
more mutual help, sharing of information, and resources. Acharya notes that the 
2004 tsunami dramatically, if tragically, showed why mutual assistance is necessary, 
while the floods that devastated Myanmar recently showed the limitations of the 
principle of non-interference.
This is not to say that there have not been collective breakthroughs even under 
current constraints. In relation to the SARS epidemic, the establishment of an 
ASEAN+3 ‘hotline’ network among designated contact points, the quick sharing of 
information, pre-departure screening, the management of suspected cases in flight, 
disinfection of aircraft, co-ordinated procedures at international departure and 
arrival points, and other measures recommended by the World Health Organization 
for travel from and to countries affected by SARS, stopped the epidemic in its tracks. 
The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response has not 
yet formally entered into force, but a number of its provisions are in place: disaster-
related specialised training, information sharing through a dedicated website and 
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communications system, a stand-by relief fund, and early warning systems for haze 
pollution, typhoons, etc. (Severino, 2008). Joint delivery by the member-states does 
help the Philippines cope up with transnational threats and dangers. 
It is in Track II where academics or the so-called epistemic communities deal with 
newly emerging human security issues. With the organisational development skills 
of its NSAs, the Philippines can be instrumental in forming a regional working group 
consisting of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds that can 
debate on options available to manage climate change, involuntary migration, and 
pandemics. Epistemic communities can build up a reservoir of cutting-edge know-
how on the nature of interlinkages between issues and the chain of events that 
might happen when a particular action or policy is carried out (Kim, 2000). Through 
these working groups, various human security propositions are interrogated with 
particular regard for the diverse historical and cultural contexts of the region. They 
are a crucial link to creating a constituent base in Track I (Morada, 2006).
Summary
Progress in human security in the Philippines is influenced by the policy-making style 
favoured by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The ‘ASEAN Way’ underscores 
a consensual approach to decision-making, informal structures and processes, and 
the principle of non-interference in member-countries’ internal affairs. Along these 
lines, ASEAN was one of the first alliances to think of comprehensive security, an 
important step toward fulfilling the first important trait of human security – the 
broadening of the agenda of security from the focus on direct violence to problems like 
poverty, epidemics, food security, human rights, and climate change. However, the 
‘ASEAN Way’ identifies the referent of security as the sovereign nation-state, which 
goes against the second important characteristic of human security – deepening of 
security from a focus on the state to a focus on human individuals and communities. 
A closer look suggested that ASEAN may be averse only to protective human security, 
which stresses ‘freedom from fear’ but challenges the state’s absolute sovereignty 
in order to intervene (with direct sanctions if necessary). ASEAN elites may be more 
comfortable with developmental human security, which stresses ‘freedom from want’ 
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and the importance of economic issues in advancing human security and sustains 
the use of coercive power by the nation-state. 
When the broader ASEAN practice of human security is filtered by contextualisation 
of member-states’ political systems, it would seem that if political will is weak, states 
with relatively open democratic practices would show constrained human security 
results but well-articulated, contextualised policies by non-state actors. That is the 
case of the Philippines. Human security issues are location-specific, multifaceted, 
constantly changing – they are best dealt with by civil society organisations that 
operate at levels beneath state obstruction (or weakness).
As ‘securitisers’, non-state organisations and players have adopted three facets of 
power – decisional, discursive, regulatory – in order to develop a robust yet flexible 
coping capability. Along these lines, Philippine NGOs have intervened, directly or 
indirectly, in the decision-making process, have shaped and disseminated politically 
relevant values and norms, and have taken the initiative to set rules themselves. 
Human security does not bypass the Philippine state, weak though it is. The most 
appropriate role for the Philippine government based on a human security agenda 
would be to facilitate productive change by its own agencies and to rebuild existing 
structures to improve their capacity and effectiveness. From a weaker vantage 
point, the Philippines can join inter-state regimes and quasi-diplomatic second-track 
arrangements, which reduce transaction costs and facilitate reciprocity among 
nations.
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